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INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, George Alvarez, a ninth grade, special education student, 
pleaded guilty to assault of a peace officer in Brownsville, Texas.1 Four 
years into his eight year sentence, Alvarez learned that the State had 
suppressed a video of the incident that proved his actual innocence.2 
The video showed the officer placing Alvarez in a chokehold and a 
headlock while Alvarez flailed beneath him.3 Alvarez later brought an 
action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the City of Brownsville, 
claiming the city violated the Brady doctrine by failing to disclose 
material exculpatory evidence. In rejecting his claim in a 2018 en banc 
opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
concluded that “case law from the Supreme Court, this circuit, and 
other circuits does not affirmatively establish that a constitutional 
violation occurs when Brady material is not shared during the plea 
bargaining process.”4 Given that around 95% of convictions are secured 
through guilty pleas,5 such an interpretation of Brady means that few 
defendants are entitled to evidence of their innocence before being 
convicted. 
This Article argues, however, that these courts are ignoring a largely 
forgotten Supreme Court opinion that was central to the creation of the 
Brady doctrine. In its 1960 opinion in Wilde v. Wyoming,6 the Supreme 
Court recognized that the suppression of favorable substantive evidence 
before a defendant’s guilty plea can violate the Due Process Clause. 
Three years later, the Supreme Court stated that its opinion in Brady v. 
Maryland7 was merely an extension of its prior opinions such as Wilde. 
And yet, while each of the other opinions that formed the foundation 
for the Brady doctrine has had a lasting legacy, the Wilde opinion has 
been lost to time despite never being repudiated. This Article calls for a 
resurrection of the Wilde opinion and the recognition of a right to 
evidence of innocence before pleading guilty. 
Part I discusses the Supreme Court opinions that laid the groundwork 
for the Brady doctrine. Part II dissects the Supreme Court’s Brady 
opinion and subsequent Supreme Court opinions interpreting the Brady 
doctrine. Part III explores the split among courts over whether there is 
 
 1 Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 385-88 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 2 See id. at 388. 
 3 See id. 
 4 Id. at 394. 
 5 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010). 
 6 362 U.S. 607, 900-01 (1960). 
 7 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
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a pre-plea right to substantive evidence of innocence. Part IV makes the 
case for recognizing that Wilde recognized a clear right to evidence of 
innocence before pleading guilty. Finally, Part V argues that the 
Supreme Court did not impliedly repudiate Wilde in its opinion in 
United States v. Ruiz.  
I. THE ROAD TO BRADY 
A. Introduction 
There were six key Supreme Court cases that the Brady Court used in 
creating the Brady doctrine.8 These were all cases that involved 
allegations that the subornation of perjury and/or the suppression of 
exculpatory evidence violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause, which states: “[N]or shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”9 This Part 
focuses on these six cases that formed the foundation for the Brady 
doctrine to flesh out its history and contours. 
B. Mooney v. Holohan 
The Supreme Court first suggested10 that the knowing subornation of 
perjury (i.e., a prosecutor calling a witness he knows will lie) can violate 
the Due Process Clause in its 1935 opinion in Mooney v. Holohan.11 In 
1916, before the United States entered what became known as World 
War I, a pro-war rally was held near the intersection of Steuart and 
Market Streets in San Francisco.12 During the rally, a bomb went off at 
2:06 p.m., killing nine people and injuring several others.13 Pinkerton 
Detective Martin Swanson soon had a suspect: “Thomas J. Mooney, a 
militant Socialist and labor activist, who had already been charged and 
acquitted several times of transporting explosives with the purpose of 
destroying the transmission lines of the Pacific Gas and Electric 
 
 8 See id. at 86-87.  
 9 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 10 See, e.g., Stephen A. Saltzburg, Perjury and False Testimony: Should the Difference 
Matter So Much?, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1537, 1554 (2000) (“The first case to hold that a 
prosecutor who knowingly used false or perjured testimony denied a defendant due 
process was Mooney v. Holohan.”). 
 11 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 111-13 (1935). 
 12 Rebecca Roiphe, Lawyering at the Extremes: The Representation of Tom Mooney, 
1916-1939, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1731, 1731, 1754 n.113 (2009). 
 13 See Ex parte Mooney, 73 P.2d 554, 557 (Cal. 1937). 
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Company (PG&E).”14 The State eventually secured first-degree murder 
convictions and death sentences against Mooney and his alleged co-
conspirators.15 
At the time, observers noted the lack of evidence against Mooney.16 
The State’s star witness was Frank Oxman, a wealthy cattleman, who 
was the only person “to put Mooney at the scene of explosion at the 
correct time.”17 Oxman testified that he had seen Mooney and his 
assistant place a suitcase outside a saloon near the explosion at around 
1:45 p.m., with Mooney saying, “Let’s go; the bulls will be after us.”18 
This timing was key because Mooney was photographed at 2:01 p.m. on 
the roof of his apartment on Market Street between Fifth and Sixth 
Streets, more than a mile away from the site of the explosion; the 1:45 
p.m. sighting gave “ample time for Mooney to return to his building 
where he had been photographed.”19  
After he was convicted of murder, Mooney filed a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus with the United States District Court for the District of 
Northern California based on evidence that, inter alia, Oxman was not 
in San Francisco at the time of the explosion.20 Mooney’s petition 
alleged two violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause: (1) the State secured his conviction through the knowing use of 
perjured testimony and the deliberate suppression of impeachment 
evidence; and (2) the state of California failed to provide a corrective 
judicial process.21  
Mooney’s petition eventually reached the Supreme Court, which did 
not address Mooney’s contention of suppressed evidence in its per 
curiam opinion.22 The Court, however, made a powerful proclamation 
with regard to perjured testimony. According to the Court, the 
requirement of due process,  
cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if 
a State has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial 
which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant 
of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by 
 
 14 Roiphe, supra note 12, at 1731. 
 15 See Mooney, 294 U.S. at 109. 
 16 See Roiphe, supra note 12, at 1731. 
 17 Id. at 1741. 
 18 Id. at 1741-42. 
 19 Id. at 1742. 
 20 See Mooney, 294 U.S. at 109-10; Roiphe, supra note 12, at 1745. 
 21 See Mooney, 294 U.S. at 110. 
 22 See generally id. 
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the presentation of testimony known to be perjured. Such a 
contrivance by a State to procure the conviction and 
imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent with the 
rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like 
result by intimidation.23  
The Court, however, found that California did provide for a 
corrective judicial process by allowing for writs of habeas corpus.24 
Because Mooney had not applied to the state for a writ of habeas corpus, 
the Court denied him relief, but without prejudice.25 Mooney later filed 
a habeas petition in state court, with the Supreme Court of California 
eventually denying him relief based upon a lack of evidence that the 
State had suborned perjury.26 Finally, in 1937, California Governor 
Culbert L. Olson pardoned Mooney, claiming that he was innocent.27  
The opinion of the Court in Mooney thus created the idea that the 
knowing subornation of perjury can violate the Due Process Clause. 
C. Pyle v. Kansas 
Seven years after its decision in Mooney, the Supreme Court addressed 
another allegation that a conviction was tainted by perjury in Pyle v. 
Kansas28 in 1942. In 1934, August and Otto Reiter had $24,000 in 
government bonds buried near their home outside Hudson, Kansas.29 
Two days before Christmas, Harry Pyle and his son “Babe” were 
allegedly involved in a plan to steal the money that ended with August 
being fatally shot.30 After he was convicted of robbery and murder, 
Harry Pyle unsuccessfully brought a pro se petition for writ of habeas 
corpus in state court.31 
Harry Pyle thereafter appealed to the United States Supreme Court, 
alleging a laundry list of constitutional violations.32 Specifically, he 
claimed that the State had (1) threatened two witnesses for the 
 
 23 Id. at 112. 
 24 See id. at 113. 
 25 See id. at 115. 
 26 See Ex parte Mooney, 73 P.2d 554, 596 (Cal. 1937). 
 27 See Roiphe, supra note 12, at 1759. Olson had previously asked Mooney to 
support his gubernatorial bid in exchange for a promise that his first act would be to 
pardon Mooney. See id. 
 28 Pyle v. State of Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 214 (1942).  
 29 See State v. Pyle, 57 P.2d 93, 94 (Kan. 1936). 
 30 Id. at 96-97. 
 31 See Pyle, 317 U.S. at 213-14. 
 32 See id. at 215-16.  
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prosecution, including one committed to a mental institution, into 
testifying falsely against him; and (2) suppressed the exculpatory 
testimony of a husband and wife through intimidation.33 The Supreme 
Court cited two exhibits in support of these allegations: a letter and an 
affidavit by a man named Truman Reynolds, who claimed that he was 
forced to give perjured testimony and wrote to Harry Pyle that “Your 
conviction was a grave mistake.”34  
The Supreme Court found that Harry Pyle’s papers were inexpertly 
drawn but that they did “set forth allegations that his imprisonment 
resulted from perjured testimony, knowingly used by the State 
authorities to obtain his conviction, and from the deliberate suppression 
by those same authorities of evidence favorable to him.”35 Citing 
Mooney, the Court held that these allegations, if true, would establish a 
Constitutional violation and that they were supported by the 
aforementioned exhibits.36 Because there had been no legal 
determination of the veracity of these allegations, the Supreme Court 
reversed the denial of habeas relief and remanded for further 
proceedings.37 
On remand, the Supreme Court of Kansas subsequently found that 
Harry Pyle had failed to prove that the State either knowingly suborned 
perjury or suppressed exculpatory evidence; the court therefore denied 
his petition for writ of habeas corpus.38 It does not appear that the elder 
Pyle ever received relief, but his son “Babe” was later pardoned in 
1959.39 
In Pyle, the Court thus built upon Mooney, suggesting that either the 
knowing subornation of perjury or the willful suppression of 
exculpatory evidence can violate the Due Process Clause. 
D. Durley v. Mayo 
Twelve years after its opinion in Pyle, the United States Supreme 
Court had an opportunity to address whether Mooney and Pyle applied 
in a case of unknowingly suborned perjury in Durley v. Mayo40 in 1956. 
 
 33 See id. at 214. 
 34 Id. at 215. 
 35 Id. at 215-16. 
 36 See id. at 216. 
 37 See id. 
 38 See Pyle v. Amrine, 156 P.2d 509, 518-21 (Kan. 1945).  
 39 See Janet Moore, Democracy and Criminal Discovery Reform After Connick and 
Garcetti, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1329, 1337 n.58 (2012). 
 40 Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277 (1956). 
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In 1945, Dan Durley was charged with three counts of “Horse or Cattle 
Stealing” based upon his alleged theft of two steers, two cows, and one 
heifer in Polk County, Florida.41 The only evidence linking Durley to 
the thefts was the testimony of Durley’s alleged accomplices, R. B. 
Massey, Jr. and Charles Bath.42 After Durley was convicted, he filed 
successive petitions for relief.43 One of these was a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus claiming that his conviction was unconstitutional because 
the prosecution unknowingly suborned perjury by Massey and Bath.44 
In support of his petition, Durley submitted two affidavits.45 The first 
affidavit was by inmate J. E. Croft, who claimed that Bath told him that 
Durley was “completely innocent” and that Massey and he created a 
plan to pin the crimes on Durley if they were caught in connection with 
their cattle-stealing ventures.46 The second affidavit was by Massey, who 
stated, “Before God is my judge Dan Durley, never had anything to do 
with any cattle stealing that I testified to at the trial.”47 While Durley 
did not allege that the State was aware that it was suborning perjury at 
his trial, he did claim that the State could not “let his conviction stand 
solely on perjured testimony.”48 The Supreme Court of Florida 
ultimately denied Durley relief without a hearing.49 
In a majority opinion, the United States Supreme Court later 
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Durley’s appeal because the 
Supreme Court of Florida’s opinion may have been based on state, 
rather than federal, grounds.50 Justice Douglas, however, wrote a 
dissenting opinion that was joined by three other justices.51 After 
finding jurisdiction, Justice Douglas cited Mooney and Pyle for the 
proposition that “[i]t is well settled that to obtain a conviction by the 
use of testimony known by the prosecution to be perjured offends due 
process.”52 According to Justice Douglas, “[w]hile the petition did not 
allege that the prosecution knew that petitioner’s codefendants were 
lying when they implicated petitioner, the State now knows that the 
 
 41 Id. at 278. 
 42 See id. at 286 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 43 See id. at 286-88. 
 44 See id. at 286-87. 
 45 See id. at 287. 
 46 Id.  
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 288. 
 49 See id. at 285. 
 50 See id. 
 51 See id. 
 52 Id. at 290-91. 
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testimony of the only witnesses against petitioner was false.”53 Based 
upon the lack of any remaining competent evidence to support Durley’s 
conviction, Justice Douglas held that the denial of a hearing on Durley’s 
habeas petition deprived him of due process of law.54  
E. Alcorta v. Texas 
The following year, in 1957, the Supreme Court addressed another 
allegation of suborned perjury in Alcorta v. Texas.55 In 1955, Alvaro 
Alcorta came home to his house at about 2:00 a.m. and saw his wife and 
a man named Natividad Castilleja sitting in a car in front of the house.56 
Alcorta pulled out a knife and fatally stabbed his wife.57 According to 
Alcorta, Castilleja and his wife were kissing.58 Castilleja, however, 
testified that Alcorta’s wife and he were just casual friends, that he had 
driven her home on the night in question, and that they were parked in 
front of the house due to engine trouble.59 Because the jury credited 
Castilleja’s story, they found Alcorta guilty of murder and gave him a 
death sentence. If the jury had believed Alcorta’s story that seeing his 
wife kissing another man sent him into a rage, they could have found 
him guilty of murder without malice, which carried a maximum 
sentence of five years of incarceration.60  
Alcorta later brought a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that 
the prosecutor in his case had knowingly suborned perjury by 
Castilleja.61 At the hearing on that petition, Castilleja testified that he 
told the prosecutor that he’d had sexual intercourse with Alcorta’s wife 
on five or six occasions shortly before her death.62 According to 
Castilleja, “the prosecutor had told him he should not volunteer any 
information about such intercourse but if specifically asked about it to 
answer truthfully.”63 The prosecutor subsequently admitted in 
testimony that he had knowingly suborned perjury by Castilleja.64 
 
 53 Id. at 291. 
 54 See id. 
 55 Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957). 
 56 Brief for Petitioner at 7, Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957) (No. 139), 1957 WL 
87099, at *7. 
 57 See Alcorta, 355 U.S. at 28-29. 
 58 See id. 
 59 See id. at 29. 
 60 See id. at 29, 32. 
 61 See id. at 30. 
 62 See id. at 30-31. 
 63 Id. at 31. 
 64 See id. 
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Based on this evidence, the Supreme Court held that Alcorta was 
denied due process under the principles laid down in Mooney and Pyle.65 
The Court concluded that the perjury knowingly suborned by the 
prosecutor “gave the jury the false impression that [Castilleja’s] 
relationship with [Alcorta]’s wife was nothing more than that of casual 
friendship.”66 Finding that in the absence of such perjury the jury might 
merely have found Alcorta guilty of the less serious offense of murder 
without malice, the Court reversed and remanded to the Court of 
Criminal Appeals of Texas for further proceedings.67 Following the 
mandate of the Supreme Court, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed 
Alcorta’s murder conviction.68 
F. Napue v. Illinois 
Two years after Alcorta, the Supreme Court further extended the 
holding from Mooney in its 1959 opinion in Napue v. Illinois.69 In 1938, 
Henry Napue and three other men allegedly entered a dimly lit Chicago 
lounge and announced their intention to rob it.70 An off-duty police 
officer responded by pulling out a gun and firing it; the officer was then 
killed in the ensuing shootout.71 Due to the lack of light and the passage 
of time before Napue was prosecuted for murder, the State relied heavily 
on the testimony of Napue’s alleged accomplice, George Hamer, who 
was already serving a 199 year sentence in connection with the 
incident.72 
At Napue’s trial, Hamer testified that he was not testifying based upon 
a promise of consideration by the Assistant State’s Attorney.73 The 
Assistant State’s Attorney had, however, made such a promise.74 And, 
while the Assistant State’s Attorney did not expect Hamer’s false 
testimony, he did nothing to correct it.75 The jury was told, however, 
 
 65 See id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 See id. at 32. 
 68 See Alcorta v. State, 308 S.W.2d 519, 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 1957). 
 69 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-72 (1959); see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
83, 87 (1963) (“In Napue v. Illinois, . . . we extended the test formulated in Mooney v. 
Holohan . . . .”). 
 70 See Napue, 360 U.S. at 265. 
 71 See id. 
 72 See id. at 265-66. 
 73 See id. at 265. 
 74 See id.  
 75 See id.  
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“that a public defender had promised ‘to do what he could’ for 
[Hamer].”76  
Napue’s post-conviction petition was eventually denied by the 
Supreme Court of Illinois, which found no due process violation 
because the jury had heard about the public defender’s offer to aid 
Hamer.77 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court disagreed. The 
Court first cited Mooney, Pyle, and related cases for the proposition “that 
a conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such 
by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”78 It then cited Alcorta and related cases to conclude that 
“[t]he same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false 
evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.”79 The Court 
went on to note that “[t]he principle that a State may not knowingly use 
false evidence, including false testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction 
. . . does not cease to apply merely because the false testimony goes only 
to the credibility of the witness.”80 Instead, “[t]he jury’s estimate of the 
truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative 
of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible 
interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant’s life or 
liberty may depend.”81 
In March 1960, the State dismissed the charges against Napue.82 He 
later sought compensation for his twenty years of false imprisonment, 
but the Illinois Court of Claims denied his request, finding that Napue 
hadn’t proven his innocence by a preponderance of the evidence.83 
G. Wilde v. Wyoming 
One year after Napue was decided, in 1960, the Supreme Court issued 
its opinion in Wilde v. Wyoming, with petitioner Victor Donald Wilde 
representing himself pro se. Wilde is a short per curiam opinion, 
consisting of only four sentences.84 Here is the entirety of the Court’s 
opinion: 
 
 76 Id. 
 77 See id. at 268. 
 78 Id. at 269. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 See Meghan Barrett Cousino, Henry Napue, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetailpre1989.aspx?caseid=
236. [https://perma.cc/Z92V-M9ZV] (last visited Oct. 23, 2019). 
 83 See id. 
 84 Wilde v. Wyoming, 362 U.S. 607 (1960). 
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The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the 
petition for writ of certiorari are granted. In petitions for writ of 
habeas corpus, filed with the Second Judicial District Court of 
the State of Wyoming and with the Wyoming Supreme Court, 
the petitioner alleged, among other grounds for relief, that his 
plea of guilty to second-degree murder in December 1945, upon 
which he received a life sentence, was induced when he ‘had no 
counsel present’ and that the prosecutor wilfully suppressed the 
testimony of two eyewitnesses to the alleged crime which would 
have exonerated the petitioner. It does not appear from the 
record that an adequate hearing on these allegations was held 
in the District Court, or any hearing of any nature in, or by 
direction of, the Supreme Court. We find nothing in our 
examination of the record to justify the denial of hearing on 
these allegations. The judgment is therefore vacated and the 
case is remanded for a hearing thereon. Com. of Pennsylvania ex 
rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116, 76 S.Ct. 223, 100 L.Ed. 
126; Sublett v. Adams, 362 U.S. 143, 80 S.Ct. 527, 4 L.Ed.2d 
527.85 
Until recently, this was the only publicly available information about 
the Wilde case: (1) Victor Donald Wilde claimed that his guilty plea to 
second-degree murder was improperly induced because, inter alia, the 
State willfully suppressed two exculpatory eyewitness statements; and 
(2) the Supreme Court remanded because the Wyoming courts had not 
justified the denial of a hearing on Wilde’s claim. But, as will be 
discussed infra, new documents reveal that Wilde actually created a 
right to evidence of innocence before pleading guilty. 
II. BRADY AND ITS AFTERMATH 
A. Brady v. Maryland 
The Supreme Court finally wove together the strands of these six 
opinions in 1963 to create the Brady doctrine. In June 1958, John Leo 
Brady’s sweetheart Nancy Boblit McGowan (who was married to a man 
named Slim) told him that she was pregnant with his child.86 To prove 
how much he was committed to McGowan, Brady wrote her a check for 
 
 85 Id. 
 86 See Thomas L. Dybdahl, An Odd, Almost Senseless Series of Events, MARSHALL 
PROJECT (June 24, 2018, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/06/24/ 
an-odd-almost-senseless-series-of-events. 
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$35,000 and told her, “Somehow, . . . in two weeks it’ll be in the bank.”87 
Brady, who was earning $1.50 an hour at a tobacco packing company, 
devised a plan with McGowan’s brother Donald Boblit to rob a bank in 
Stevensville, Maryland.88 Because Brady’s 1947 Ford was unreliable, he 
and Boblit decided to forcibly “borrow” the Ford Fairlane belonging to 
acquaintance William Brooks.89 The eventual encounter ended with 
Brooks being fatally strangled.90 
Prior to Brady’s murder trial, his attorney made a request to view all 
of Boblit’s extrajudicial statements made in connection with the case 
and was shown some of these statements.91 At Brady’s ensuing murder 
trial, Boblit testified that Brady was the one who strangled Brooks.92 At 
the end of that trial, Brady was convicted of first-degree murder and 
given the death penalty.93 After being given the death penalty, Brady 
appealed, claiming that the State had suppressed an unsigned statement 
by Boblit in which he admitted that he was the one who strangled 
Brooks.94 After a full hearing, the circuit court denied Brady relief.95 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland later reversed, concluding that 
“[t]he suppression or withholding by the State of material evidence 
exculpatory to an accused is a violation of due process.”96 As support 
for this holding, Maryland’s highest court cited several opinions, 
including two from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit.97 The first opinion was United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, in 
which the court used Mooney and Pyle to find a due process violation 
based on the suppression of an exculpatory ballistics analysis of a 
bloody bullet found at a murder scene.98 And the second opinion was 
United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, in which the court found a due 
process violation based on the suppression of evidence of the 
defendant’s intoxication, which could have been used to rebut the 
 
 87 Id. 
 88 See id. 
 89 See id. 
 90 See id. 
 91 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963). 
 92 See Brady v. State, 174 A.2d 167, 168 (Md. 1961). 
 93 See Brady, 373 U.S. at 84. 
 94 See id. 
 95 See id. at 84-85. 
 96 Brady, 174 A.2d at 169. 
 97 See id. (first citing United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 
1952), and then citing United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 
1955)). 
 98 See United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815, 820-21 (3d Cir. 1952). 
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State’s claim that he committed premeditated murder.99 Applying 
similar reasoning, the Court of Appeals of Maryland found a due process 
violation, concluding that Boblit’s suppressed confession was material 
to Brady’s punishment because it could have led the jury to impose a 
life sentence instead of a death sentence.100  
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed this ruling in 
Brady v. Maryland.101 The Court began by proclaiming that “[t]his 
ruling is an extension of Mooney v. Holohan,” which, as noted, held that 
the knowing subornation of perjury violates the Due Process Clause.102 
The Brady Court then observed that Pyle v. Kansas phrased this rule 
from Mooney “in broader terms” by concluding that allegations of 
knowingly suborned perjury and suppressed evidence were sufficient to 
charge a deprivation of rights.103 Next, the Court noted that the Third 
Circuit in the aforementioned Baldi case interpreted Pyle as holding 
“that the ‘suppression of evidence favorable’ to the accused was itself 
sufficient to amount to a denial of due process.”104  
The Supreme Court then indicated that “[i]n Napue v. Illinois . . . we 
extended the test formulated in Mooney v. Holohan when we said: ‘The 
same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false 
evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.’”105 Immediately 
after this citation to Napue, the Brady Court added an “And see” citation 
to Alcorta v. Texas and Wilde v. Wyoming as well as a “Cf.” citation to 
the dissenting opinion in Durley v. Mayo.106 And then, immediately after 
citing to these three opinions, the Court created the Brady doctrine: 
“We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence 
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the 
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the 
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”107 
After creating this Brady doctrine, the Court explained how it was 
merely an extension of Mooney and its progeny. According to the Court, 
“[t]he principle of Mooney v. Holohan is not punishment of society for 
misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the 
 
 99 See United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763, 766-78 (3d Cir. 1955). 
 100 See Brady, 174 A.2d at 171-72. 
 101 373 U.S. 83, 90 (1963). 
 102 See id. at 86. Even before citing Mooney, the Court noted that the Third Circuit’s 
opinions in Baldi and Dye had “state[d] the correct constitutional rule.” Id.  
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 87 (citing Baldi, 195 F.2d at 820). 
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accused.”108 This is because “[s]ociety wins not only when the guilty 
are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the 
administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated 
unfairly.”109 Therefore, the suppression of favorable evidence, like the 
subornation of perjury, is a due process violation irrespective of the 
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.110 Finding that Boblit’s 
confession was favorable and material to Brady’s punishment, the 
Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals of Maryland that its 
suppression was a due process violation even though it was not 
withheld in bad faith.111 
B. Brady’s Aftermath 
While the Supreme Court in Brady recognized an obligation for the 
State to disclose material exculpatory evidence, it left open a number of 
questions, such as when this obligation is triggered and whether it 
covers impeachment evidence as well as substantive evidence. Since 
Brady, there have been a number of Supreme Court opinions 
interpreting the Brady doctrine, but this Article will focus on the 
handful that are related to the question of whether there is a right to 
evidence of innocence before pleading guilty.  
1. Giglio v. United States 
In Brady, the Supreme Court found that the State’s failure to disclose 
material substantive evidence violates the Due Process Clause.112 
Substantive evidence is evidence that directly bears upon the 
defendant’s innocence (or culpability) such as an eyewitness’ 
identification of an alternate suspect, forensic evidence, or an alternate 
 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 See id. at 87-88. 
 111 See id. at 86-87; see also Norman C. Bay, Old Blood, Bad Blood, and Youngblood: 
Due Process, Lost Evidence, and the Limits of Bad Faith, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 241, 256 
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the absence of bad faith.”); Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE 
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under Brady is not subject to a good faith exception.”). 
 112 See, e.g., Abbott v. United States, 195 F.3d 946, 948 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that 
the Supreme Court found that suppression of material substantive evidence violates the 
Due Process Clause in Brady and extended this holding to cover material impeachment 
evidence in Giglio); Colin Miller, Plea Agreements as Constitutional Contracts, 97 N.C. 
L. REV. 31, 67 (2018). 
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suspect’s confession.113 In its 1972 opinion in Giglio v. United States,114 
the Supreme Court extended the Brady doctrine to cover material 
impeachment evidence, i.e., evidence that calls into question the 
credibility of a witness for the prosecution.115 In 1966, John Giglio 
allegedly concocted a scheme in which he would steal Travellers’ 
Express money orders and give them to nineteen-year-old bank teller 
Robert Taliento, who would cash them so that they could share the 
proceeds.116 Giglio was eventually convicted of passing forged money 
orders based in large part upon Taliento’s testimony.117 At trial, Taliento 
testified that nobody told him he could avoid being prosecuted if he 
testified against Giglio, and the Assistant U.S. Attorney (“AUSA,” i.e., 
the federal prosecutor) told the jury that “‘(Taliento) received no 
promises that he would not be indicted.’”118 Unbeknownst to the trial 
AUSA, the prior AUSA handling the case had told Taliento that he 
wouldn’t be prosecuted if he testified against Giglio before the grand 
jury and at trial.119 
Giglio’s appeal of his conviction eventually reached the United States 
Supreme Court, which, inter alia, cited (1) Brady v. Maryland for the 
proposition that the State has a duty to disclose material exculpatory 
evidence;120 and (2) Napue v. Illinois to conclude that “[w]hen the 
‘reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or 
innocence,’ nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within 
this general rule.”121 Applying this precedent to the case at hand, the 
Giglio Court found that the promise made by the first AUSA was 
attributable to the government even though the trial AUSA wasn’t aware 
of it.122 The Court then concluded that this promise was material 
impeachment evidence because “the Government’s case depended 
almost entirely on Taliento’s testimony; without it there could have 
 
 113 See, e.g., State v. Coleman, 742 S.E.2d 346, 350 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (“It is 
axiomatic that in a criminal trial when substantive evidence is admitted, it bears directly 
upon the question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.”). 
 114 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
 115 See, e.g., Sterkel v. Fruehauf Corp., 975 F.2d 528, 532 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(“Impeachment is an attack on the credibility of a witness . . . .”). 
 116 See Brief for the United States at 2-3, Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) 
(No. 70-29), 1971 WL 133464, at *2-3. 
 117 See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 151. 
 118 Id. at 151-52. 
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 120 See id. at 153. 
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been no indictment and no evidence to carry the case to the jury.”123 
Accordingly, the Giglio Court held that the non-disclosure of this 
promise violated the Brady doctrine.124 
In United States v. Bagley, the Supreme Court later observed that 
Giglio obligates prosecutors to disclose material impeachment evidence 
related to key Government witnesses.125 When defendants allege that 
the State has failed to disclose material impeachment evidence, courts 
frequently use phrases such as “Giglio evidence,”126 “Giglio rule,”127 
“Giglio claim,”128 and “Giglio violation.”129 
2. United States v. Agurs 
In its 1976 opinion in United States v. Agurs,130 the Supreme Court 
again extended the Brady rule while at the same time noting that the 
Brady opinion had combined the Supreme Court cases preceding it to 
create one comprehensive rule. In Agurs, prostitute Linda Agurs fatally 
stabbed her john, James Sewell, with a bowie knife after he caught her 
emptying his wallet in their motel room.131 After Agurs was convicted 
of second-degree murder, she appealed, claiming that the State had 
suppressed evidence of Sewell’s violent criminal record, which would 
have supported her claim of self-defense.132  
In addressing Agurs’s claim, the Supreme Court initially held that 
“[t]he rule of Brady v. Maryland . . . arguably applies in three quite 
different situations. Each involves the discovery, after trial of 
information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to 
 
 123 Id. at 154-55. 
 124 See id. at 155. 
 125 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676-77 (1985). 
 126 See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 562 F.3d 947, 952 n.7 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(“However, the nondisclosure of Giglio evidence only justifies a retrial if the withheld 
information is deemed material.”). 
 127 See, e.g., Smith v. Sec’y, Dept. of Corrs., 572 F.3d 1327, 1335 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(“Accurate statements do not violate the Giglio rule.”). 
 128 See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 690 n.11 (2004) (“Because we conclude 
that Banks qualifies for relief under Brady, we need not decide whether a Giglio claim, 
to warrant adjudication, must be separately pleaded.”). 
 129 See, e.g., Barwick v. State, 88 So. 3d 85, 103 (Fla. 2011) (“To demonstrate a Giglio 
violation, a defendant must prove that (1) the prosecutor presented or failed to correct 
false testimony; (2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3) the false 
evidence was material.”). 
 130 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 
 131 See id. at 99. 
 132 See id. at 100. 
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the defense.”133 The first situation covered by the Brady rule is a case in 
which the prosecution suborns perjury at trial, as typified by Mooney v. 
Holohan.134 The second situation is the Brady case itself, in which the 
defense makes a request for specific evidence — like Brady’s request all 
of Boblit’s extrajudicial statements — and the State fails to produce 
material exculpatory evidence.135  
The third situation, which the Court was addressing in Agurs, is one 
in which the prosecution fails to disclose material exculpatory evidence 
in response to no request for exculpatory evidence or possibly a general 
request for “all Brady material” or for “anything exculpatory.”136 The 
Agurs Court concluded that the State does have a duty to disclose 
exculpatory evidence in this third situation if that evidence is 
“material.”137 The Court then explained that evidence is material “if the 
omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise 
exist.”138 Applying this standard to the case at hand, the Court reached 
the following conclusion: 
Since the arrest record was not requested and did not even 
arguably give rise to any inference of perjury, since after 
considering it in the context of the entire record the trial judge 
remained convinced of [Agurs]’s guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and since we are satisfied that his firsthand appraisal of 
the record was thorough and entirely reasonable, we hold that 
the prosecutor’s failure to tender Sewell’s record to the defense 
did not deprive respondent of a fair trial as guaranteed by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.139 
3. United States v. Bagley 
In its 1985 opinion in United States v. Bagley,140 the Supreme Court 
answered the question of whether this same standard of “materiality” 
applies in cases in which the defense makes a specific request for 
impeachment evidence. In Bagley, Hughes Bagley was indicted on 
fifteen charges of violating various firearms and narcotics statutes.141 
 
 133 Id. at 103 (citation omitted). 
 134 See id. 
 135 See id. at 104. 
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2019] The Right to Evidence of Innocence Before Pleading Guilty 289 
Before trial, defense counsel filed a discovery motion which asked for, 
inter alia, “[t]he names and addresses of witnesses that the government 
intends to call at trial. Also the prior criminal records of witnesses, and 
any deals, promises or inducements made to witnesses in exchange for 
their testimony.”142 In response, the State disclosed, inter alia, 
information relating to its two principal witnesses but did not disclose 
any “deals, promises or inducements” that had been made to them.143  
After Bagley was convicted, he appealed, claiming that the State failed 
to disclose that both of these witnesses had entered into a “Contract for 
Purchase of Information and Payment of Lump Sum Therefor.”144 These 
contracts each contained the following typed description of services: 
That he will provide information regarding T-I and other 
violations committed by Hughes A. Bagley, Jr.; that he will 
purchase evidence for ATF; that he will cut [sic] in an 
undercover capacity for ATF; that he will assist ATF in 
gathering of evidence and testify against the violator in federal 
court.145 
At the bottom of these contracts, “[t]he figure ‘$300.00’ was 
handwritten in each form on a line entitled ‘Sum to Be Paid to 
Vendor.’”146 
Bagley claimed that these contracts were material impeachment 
evidence of incentivized testimony that the State failed to disclose in 
response to a specific discovery request.147 As in Agurs, the district court 
found that the disclosure of this impeachment evidence would not have 
changed the outcome at trial.148 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit disagreed, 
observing that “[s]tanding alone, the government’s failure to produce 
requested Brady information is a serious due process violation.”149 The 
court then added that “a failure to disclose requested Brady information 
that the defendant could use to conduct an effective cross-examination 
is even more egregious because it threatens the defendant’s right to 
confront adverse witnesses, and therefore, his right to a fair trial.”150 As 
a result, the court concluded “that the government’s failure to provide 
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requested Brady information to Bagley so that he could effectively cross-
examine two important government witnesses requires an automatic 
reversal.”151 
The Supreme Court later disagreed with this holding. It noted that 
“[t]he Court of Appeals treated impeachment evidence as 
constitutionally different from exculpatory evidence” by holding that its 
non-disclosure requires automatic reversal.152 The Bagley Court 
rejected this reasoning, proclaiming that “[t]his Court has rejected any 
such distinction between impeachment evidence and exculpatory 
evidence.”153 As support, the Court cited to Giglio, in which it had 
required a showing of materiality before finding that the non-disclosure 
of impeachment evidence was a due process violation.154 
The Bagley Court then added that the same test of materiality applies 
in “no request,” “general request,” and “specific request” cases: “The 
evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had 
the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.”155 Put another way, “[a] ‘reasonable 
probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.”156 The Court then remanded the case to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held that the suppressed 
contracts were material, meaning that Bagley had established a Brady 
violation.157  
While it might have seemed relatively unimportant at the time, as will 
be discussed infra, the Court’s comparison of impeachment and 
substantive evidence in Bagley has ended up playing an outsized rule in 
determining whether there is a right to evidence before pleading guilty. 
4. Kyles v. Whitley 
In its 1995 opinion in Kyles v. Whitley,158 the Supreme Court (1) 
further clarified this materiality test; and (2) fleshed out the State’s duty 
to discover favorable evidence that was established in Giglio. After his 
first trial ended in a hung jury, Curtis Lee Kyles was convicted of the 
first-degree murder of Dolores Dye in a New Orleans grocery store 
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parking lot in 1984.159 Kyles subsequently appealed, claiming that the 
State suppressed six pieces of evidence, including exculpatory 
eyewitness statements and “the computer print-out of license numbers 
of cars parked at [the grocery store] on the night of the murder, which 
did not list the number of Kyles’s car.”160  
In finding a due process violation, the Kyles Court reached several 
conclusions about the Brady test, including two that will be addressed 
here. First, the Court held that “a showing of materiality does not 
require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the 
suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant’s 
acquittal.”161 Thus, while a defendant must establish a reasonable 
probability that withheld evidence would have created a different 
outcome at trial, he does not have to make this showing by a 
preponderance of the evidence, i.e., does not have to show that it was 
“more likely than not” the new evidence would have produced a 
different outcome.162 
Second, as noted, the Court in Giglio found a Brady violation based 
upon the trial AUSA being unaware of a promise that the prior AUSA 
had made to a witness for the prosecution.163 In other words, the Giglio 
Court placed a duty on a trial prosecutor to learn about exculpatory 
evidence connected to another prosecutor.164 In Kyles, the undisclosed 
exculpatory evidence was in the possession of the police, who had not 
turned it over to the prosecution.165 Nonetheless, the Court was able to 
find a Brady violation by concluding “that the individual prosecutor has 
a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on 
the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.”166  
Because the Court found a Brady violation, Kyles was given a new 
trial.167 That new trial ended in a hung jury, as did two subsequent 
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trials.168 New Orleans District Attorney Harry Connick finally dismissed 
the charges against Kyles in 1998, and he received $150,000 in state 
compensation.169 
As will be discussed infra, both of the Supreme Court’s holdings in 
Kyles bear directly upon the questions of when and how a pre-plea right 
to substantive evidence of innocence might be triggered. 
5. United States v. Ruiz 
Finally, in its 2002 opinion in United States v. Ruiz, the Supreme 
Court limited the scope of the Giglio right to material impeachment 
evidence.170 In August 2009, Angela Ruiz attempted to enter the United 
States at the Tecate Port of Entry while driving a 1970 Mercury Cougar; 
inspection of the vehicle revealed 66.3 pounds of marijuana hidden 
inside.171 Ruiz was thereafter charged with Importation of Marijuana 
and offered a “fast track” plea bargain, which came with a two level 
downward departure under the United States Sentencing Guidelines.172 
The plea agreement (1) stated that “‘any [known] information 
establishing the factual innocence of the defendant’ ‘has been turned 
over to the defendant’” and “acknowledge[d] the Government’s 
‘continuing duty to provide such information;’” but (2) required that 
Ruiz “‘waiv[e] the right’ to receive ‘impeachment information relating 
to any informants or other witnesses’ as well as the right to receive 
information supporting any affirmative defense the defendant raises if 
the case goes to trial.”173 
Ruiz refused to sign the plea agreement and ended up pleading guilty 
without the benefit of a plea bargain.174 At sentencing, she 
unsuccessfully sought the same two-level downward departure that she 
would have received under the plea deal.175 Ruiz thereafter appealed, 
claiming that the plea bargain violated her pre-plea right to material 
impeachment evidence.176 The Ninth Circuit agreed, concluding that a 
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guilty plea is not voluntary “unless the prosecutors first made the same 
disclosure of material impeachment information that the prosecutors 
would have had to make had the defendant insisted upon a trial.”177 
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed for three reasons. First, the 
Court noted that “impeachment information is special in relation to the 
fairness of a trial, not in respect to whether a plea is voluntary.”178 
Second, the Court “found no legal authority embodied either in this 
Court’s past cases or in cases from other circuits that provides 
significant support for the Ninth Circuit’s decision”; instead, prior 
precedent established that courts can accept guilty pleas “despite 
various forms of misapprehension under which a defendant might 
labor.”179 Third, the Court concluded that the clause in the rejected plea 
agreement obligating the government to provide “any information 
establishing the factual innocence of the defendant” diminished the 
concern that, “in the absence of impeachment information, innocent 
individuals, accused of crimes, will plead guilty.”180 
III. RUIZ’S AFTERMATH AND THE ALLEGED LACK OF A CLEAR RIGHT TO 
EVIDENCE OF INNOCENCE BEFORE PLEADING GUILTY 
A. Introduction 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Ruiz has led to a split among courts 
over whether defendants have a right to substantive evidence of 
innocence before pleading guilty.181 Courts concluding that there is no 
right to evidence of innocence before pleading guilty have focused on 
two factors while courts recognizing such a right have downplayed 
these two factors. The ensuing Sections will explore these factors and 
explain how the split has made it especially difficult for defendants in 
qualified immunity and federal habeas corpus actions. 
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B. No Distinction Between Impeachment and Substantive Evidence 
Courts finding no pre-plea right to substantive evidence of innocence 
have argued that there is no distinction between impeachment evidence 
and substantive evidence of innocence under Brady. Some of these 
courts have focused on the Bagley Court’s statement that the Supreme 
Court “has rejected any such distinction between impeachment 
evidence and exculpatory evidence.”182 Other courts have alleged that 
Ruiz itself created no distinction between these two types of evidence.183 
According to these courts, because there is no pre-plea right to 
impeachment evidence, there must also be no pre-plea right to 
substantive evidence of innocence.184 
For example, in United States v. Conroy, Pamela Conroy pleaded 
guilty to fraud charges based upon statements she made to Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) about her home in the wake 
of Hurricane Katrina.185 After her guilty plea, Conroy learned about a 
previously undisclosed FBI interview of her friend Sandra Pierce.186 
According to the FBI report on the interview, Pierce was present for 
Conroy’s call to the FEMA representative, everything Conroy told the 
representative was correct, and Conroy left the conversation believing 
she qualified for FEMA funding.187 In finding no Brady violation, the 
Fifth Circuit rejected Conroy’s argument that Ruiz only applies to 
impeachment evidence and not substantive evidence of innocence.188 
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According to the court, “Ruiz never makes such a distinction nor can 
this proposition be implied from its discussion.”189 
Conversely, courts recognizing a right to evidence of innocence 
before pleading guilty have found that the Ruiz Court held or implied 
that there is a distinction between impeachment evidence and 
substantive evidence of innocence. For example, in Buffey v. Ballard, 
Joseph Buffey pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual assault and one 
count of robbery in West Virginia pursuant to a plea agreement.190 
Before Buffey entered his plea, the State failed to disclose that a 
lieutenant had reached the following conclusion regarding DNA testing: 
“[A]ssuming there are only two contributors (including [the victim]), 
Joseph Buffey is excluded as the donor of the seminal fluid identified 
[from the rape kit] cuttings.”191 
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found that the State’s 
failure to disclose this evidence was a Brady violation by concluding 
that, if this evidence had been disclosed, (1) Buffey would neither have 
pleaded guilty nor been told to plead guilty; and (2) the jury would not 
have convicted him.192 In reaching this conclusion, the court held that 
“the Court in Ruiz specifically distinguished impeachment evidence 
from exculpatory evidence.”193 According to the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of West Virginia, the Ruiz “Court noted that impeachment 
evidence differs from exculpatory evidence because it is not ‘critical 
information of which the defendant must always be aware prior to 
pleading guilty given the random way in which such information may, 
or may not, help a particular defendant.’”194 Some state and federal 
courts have reached similar conclusions.195 
C. No Established Precedent Creating a Right to Evidence of Innocence 
Before Pleading Guilty 
Courts that have found no pre-plea right to substantive evidence of 
innocence have often focused on the fact that there is no established 
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precedent creating a right to evidence of innocence before pleading 
guilty. As noted, in the Alvarez case from the introduction, the Fifth 
Circuit rejected a claim that the State violated the Brady doctrine by 
failing to disclose an exculpatory video to a ninth grade, special 
education student before he pleaded guilty to assaulting a peace 
officer.196 And, as noted, it reached this conclusion by finding that “case 
law from the Supreme Court, this circuit, and other circuits does not 
affirmatively establish that a constitutional violation occurs when Brady 
material is not shared during the plea bargaining process.”197 Similarly, 
in United States v. Mathur, the First Circuit rejected a defendant’s claim 
that Brady applies to the plea bargaining process, noting that “[h]e does 
not cite a single case standing for this novel approach but, rather, relies 
on authority extolling the importance of plea negotiations.”198 
The alleged lack of any precedent regarding a pre-plea right to 
evidence of innocence has most frequently hurt defendants in two 
contexts. The first context is the qualified immunity context. 
Defendants bringing civil actions against state officials for Brady 
violations must overcome claims of qualified immunity by establishing 
that (1) the official’s conduct violated a statutory or constitutional right; 
and (2) this right was “clearly established at the time of the challenged 
conduct.”199 Defendants bringing such actions have difficulty 
establishing the second part of this test due to the lack of case law clearly 
establishing the pre-plea right to material exculpatory evidence.  
For example, in Robertson v. Lucas, several Ohio defendants pleaded 
guilty to drug crimes in connection with Operation Turnaround, “a 
highly corrupt government investigation in which an informant, inter 
alia, maliciously falsely identified innocent people as participants in 
drug sales and stole controlled ‘buy money’ from DEA agents.”200 After 
the corrupt nature of Operation Turnaround was revealed, the 
prosecutor successfully moved for the dismissal of the defendants’ 
convictions.201 The defendants then brought Section 1983 actions, 
claiming that the failure of various state officials to disclose material 
exculpatory evidence connected to Operation Turnaround before they 
pleaded guilty violated the Brady doctrine.202 The Sixth Circuit, 
however, found that these officials had qualified immunity because they 
 
 196 See Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 389 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 197 See id. at 394. 
 198 United States v. Mathur, 624 F.3d 498, 506-07 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 199 Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012). 
 200 Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 626 (6th Cir. 2014) (Keith, J., concurring). 
 201 See id. at 613. 
 202 See id. 
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“were under no clearly established obligation to disclose exculpatory 
Brady material to the prosecutors in time to be put to effective use in 
plea bargaining.”203 Other courts in qualified immunity cases have 
reached the same conclusion.204 
The second context is the habeas context. When a defendant loses an 
appeal of his conviction in state court, he can file a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus in federal court, claiming that the state court proceedings 
“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.”205 Again, the alleged lack of 
established precedent establishing a pre-plea right to Brady evidence has 
hurt defendants in the habeas context. 
For example, in Carter v. Hobbs, Nickol Carter pleaded guilty to 
robbery and related crimes and later unsuccessfully appealed his 
convictions in state court in Arkansas.206 Carter thereafter filed a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court, arguing, inter alia, 
that the State withheld substantive evidence of his innocence, including 
(1) fingerprint reports from the crime scenes that did not match 
his fingerprints; (2) the lack of crime lab analysis of certain 
evidence recovered from the crime scenes; (3) inconsistent 
witness statements; (4) a DNA test from a crime-scene cigarette 
butt that did not match his DNA; and (5) a witness who was 
presented a photo lineup and identified another individual as 
the perpetrator.207 
In denying Carter relief, the court noted that “[f]irst and foremost, 
Petitioner’s claim fails because there is no clearly established 
constitutional right to the disclosure of Brady material prior to the entry 
 
 203 Id. at 621-22. 
 204 See, e.g., Warren v. City of Birmingham, No. 2:09-CV-1025-RRA, 2010 WL 
11469568, at *6 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 13, 2010) (granting an official qualified immunity 
because “[t]here is a substantial question of law as to whether, at the relevant time, a 
police officer was on notice that he would violate a criminal defendant’s due process 
rights by withholding materially exculpatory evidence when the criminal defendant 
pleads guilty rather than proceeds to trial”). 
 205 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2019). 
 206 See Carter v. Hobbs, No. 5:10CV00346 JMM/JTR, 2013 WL 1668988, at *1 (E.D. 
Ark. Mar. 25, 2013). 
 207 Id. at *5 n.5. 
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of a guilty plea.”208 Other courts addressing similar claims have reached 
the same conclusion.209  
Conversely, courts finding a clearly established pre-plea right to 
material exculpatory evidence have argued that Brady created such a 
right and that Ruiz did not circumscribe that right. For example, in 
United States v. Nelson, Gregory Nelson pleaded guilty to traveling from 
Virginia to D.C. to engage in illicit sexual contact with an undercover 
detective he believed to be a minor.210 Nelson’s claim was that he 
traveled to D.C. to buy methamphetamine, a claim that was bolstered 
by an undisclosed email in which the detective discussed his possession 
of methamphetamine with Nelson.211 Upon learning that the State had 
documentation of this email after his plea, Nelson appealed, claiming a 
Brady violation.212 The United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia agreed with him, finding that if this evidence had been 
disclosed before Nelson’s plea, “he would have taken his chances at trial 
to show that he was a drug abuser looking to score, and not someone 
intending to abuse a child.”213 
In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the Brady Court was 
not narrowly concerned about avoiding unfair trials and instead more 
broadly “expressed a general resolve to ensure that justice is served.”214 
Accordingly, “precluding a defendant from raising such a Brady claim 
after a guilty plea could create a risk too costly to the integrity of the 
system of justice to countenance . . . .”215 Moreover, the court noted that 
the Ruiz Court “drew a significant distinction between impeachment 
and exculpatory evidence and did not decide whether a defendant is 
entitled to exculpatory evidence at the guilty plea stage.”216 Indeed, the 
court went on to find that “[i]f anything, Ruiz’s discussion about the 
importance of the government disclosing evidence that may establish a 
defendant’s innocence suggests that, if confronted with the issue, the 
 
 208 Id. at *5. 
 209 See, e.g., Jones v. Bryant, 27 F. App’x. 669, 701 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The Supreme 
Court’s decisions do not clearly establish that prosecutors must reveal exculpatory 
information before trial, so under § 2254(d)(1) Jones is not entitled to relief on federal 
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 210 See United States v. Nelson, 979 F. Supp. 2d 123, 126 (D.D.C. 2013). 
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Supreme Court would hold that a defendant has a constitutional right 
to exculpatory evidence at the guilty plea stage.”217 
D. Conclusion 
In summation, some courts have held that Brady can be read as 
creating a pre-plea right to substantive evidence of innocence that was 
not circumscribed by Ruiz. Conversely, other courts have concluded 
that (1) neither Brady nor any other Supreme Court opinion established 
a pre-plea right to evidence of innocence; and (2) Ruiz can be read to 
foreclose any alleged right to evidence of innocence before pleading 
guilty. 
In order to establish that there is a clear right to evidence of innocence 
before pleading guilty, two propositions must therefore be correct: (1) 
Wilde v. Wyoming created such a right; and (2) United States v. Ruiz did 
not circumscribe that right. The next two Parts will address these two 
propositions.  
IV. WILDE V. WYOMING CREATED A RIGHT TO EVIDENCE OF INNOCENCE 
BEFORE PLEADING GUILTY 
A. Current Viability of Brady’s Progenitors 
1. Introduction 
As noted, in Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court stated that its new 
Brady doctrine was merely an “extension” of Mooney v. Holohan and its 
progeny.218 Commentators have picked up on this “extension” 
language. For example, Professor Lissa Griffin observed that the Brady 
“Court suggested that its decision was merely an extension of earlier 
decisions concerning a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial, such 
as Mooney v. Holohan . . . .”219 And Professor Bennett L. Gershman 
classified the Brady opinion as “peculiar” because “[t]he Court 
suggested that its decision in Brady was merely an ‘extension’ of earlier 
decisions concerning a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial.”220 
 
 217 Id. at 129 n.4. 
 218 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1963) (noting that “[t]his ruling is an 
extension of Mooney,” which itself was extended in subsequent opinions). 
 219 Lissa Griffin, Pretrial Procedures for Innocent People: Reforming Brady, 56 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 969, 976 n.44 (2011).  
 220 Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 
693 (2006). Professor Gershman goes on to note that those earlier opinions were 
Mooney, Pyle, Napue, Alcorta, Wilde, and Durley (Douglas, J., dissenting). Id. at 693 n.36. 
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Lower courts also have honed in on this “extension” language. For 
example, in Drumgold v. Callahan, the First Circuit noted that “Brady 
was an ‘extension’ of a line of cases beginning with Mooney v. Holohan 
. . . and Pyle v. Kansas . . . in which the Supreme Court held that a state 
actor violates a criminal defendant’s due process rights by the knowing 
use of perjured testimony or the deliberate suppression of evidence 
leading to the defendant’s conviction.”221 In this sense, Brady only 
“broke new ground in holding that a prosecutor also violates a 
defendant’s due process rights merely by failing to disclose material 
evidence in his possession that is favorable to the defendant, 
irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecutor.”222  
Indeed, in a piece for Federal Rules Decisions a year after Brady was 
decided, a federal judge observed that 
[a]lthough the Supreme court in its decision treats its holding 
as merely an extension of its decisions in Mooney v. Holohan . . . 
and Pyle v. State of Kansas . . . defense counsel have seized upon 
the Brady case as a complete innovation and have made it the 
basis for motions prior to trial to inspect all evidence in the 
hands of the prosecution favorable to the accused on the issues 
of guilt or punishment.223 
The Supreme Court eventually addressed one of these motions in its 
1967 opinion in Giles v. Maryland.224 In Giles, the Court grappled with 
the question of whether the Brady doctrine applies in the absence of a 
defense request for exculpatory evidence.225 There was no majority 
opinion in Giles, but there was a sharp divide between Justice Fortas’ 
opinion concurring in the judgment and Justice Harlan’s dissenting 
opinion. Justice Fortas (1) argued that Brady had extended the Mooney 
line of cases by holding the suppression of favorable evidence violates 
due process regardless of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution; 
and (2) saw “no reason to make th[is] result turn on the adventitious 
circumstance of a request.”226 Meanwhile, Justice Harlan could not 
“agree that this Court in Brady extended Mooney in any fashion.”227  
 
 221 Drumgold v. Callahan, 707 F.3d 28, 38 (1st Cir. 2013). 
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 224 Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967). 
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As noted, in United States v. Agurs, a majority of the Court would later 
find that Brady does apply in the absence of a defense request for 
exculpatory evidence.228 In reaching this conclusion, the Agurs majority 
twice cited to Justice Fortas’ Giles concurrence,229 seemingly 
corroborating his claim that Brady was merely an extension of the 
Mooney line of cases, with its sole innovation being to make the good 
faith or bad faith of the State irrelevant. 
Under this reading, the Mooney line of cases takes on added 
importance. If Brady merely extended Mooney and its progeny, those 
cases are illustrations of ways in which the State can violate the Due 
Process Clause, even if those cases did not grant relief. Such a reading 
is corroborated by the Supreme Court’s subsequent opinion in Agurs. 
As noted, the Agurs Court held that “[t]he rule of Brady v. Maryland . . . 
arguably applies in three quite different situations.”230 The Court then 
noted that the first situation involved the subornation of perjury and 
was typified by Mooney v. Holohan and also illustrated by, inter alia, Pyle 
v. Kansas, Alcorta v. Texas, and Napue v. Illinois.231 This reading of these 
cases seems consistent with both pre-Brady and post-Brady precedent 
citing these opinions to find due process violations despite the differing 
procedural postures of these cases. 
2. Mooney v. Holohan 
As noted, Mooney v. Holohan was a per curiam opinion in which the 
Court denied the defendant relief but noted in dicta that the knowing 
subornation of perjury can violate the Due Process Clause.232 The 
Supreme Court has since cited Mooney ninety-nine times, and, despite 
the Mooney Court denying the defendant relief, courts have frequently 
cited Mooney to find that the knowing subornation of perjury can violate 
the Due Process Clause. 
For instance, in its 1999 opinion in Limone v. Condon, the First Circuit 
denied relief to state agents seeking qualified immunity from a 
petitioner’s claim that they knowingly suborned perjury.233 In denying 
 
 228 See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109 (1976). 
 229 See id. at 109 n.16, 120. The Agurs Court also noted that Brady “expressly rejected 
the good faith or the bad faith of the prosecutor as the controlling consideration.” Id. at 
110 n.17. 
 230 Id. at 103. 
 231 See id. at 103, n.8. 
 232 See, e.g., United States v. Ohiri, 133 F. App’x. 555, 562 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding 
that Ruiz’s reasoning justifies distinguishing substantive evidence of innocence from 
impeachment evidence). 
 233 See Limone v. Condon, 372 F.3d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 2004). 
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qualified immunity, the court proclaimed that Mooney created “a duty 
to refrain from procuring convictions by the presentation of testimony 
known to be perjurious. . . .”234 Indeed, the court noted that as early as 
1951, it had “described Mooney’s core premise as ‘well-settled.’”235 
Courts sometimes combine the Supreme Court’s opinion in Mooney 
with its subsequent opinion in Napue v. Illinois in cases involving 
alleged subornation of perjury to refer to a “Mooney-Napue claim”236 or 
a “Mooney-Napue violation.”237 Other courts add the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Pyle v. Kansas to talk about the “Mooney-Pyle-Napue line of 
decisions.”238 
3. Pyle v. Kansas 
Courts have also continued to cite Pyle v. Kansas when presented with 
claims that prosecutors suborned perjury and/or suppressed material 
exculpatory evidence. And they have done so despite the fact that the 
United States Supreme Court merely remanded Henry Pyle’s case to the 
Supreme Court of Kansas, which ultimately found neither subornation 
of perjury nor suppression of evidence.239 There are at least four 
important observations concerning these continued citations. First, as 
just noted, despite the Pyle Court merely remanding, courts have cited 
to the “Mooney-Pyle-Napue line of decisions” to find due process 
violations based on the subornation of perjury.240 
Second, courts also cite Pyle by itself to find that the knowing 
subornation of perjury violates the Due Process Clause. For example, in 
United States ex rel. Jones v. Franzen, the petitioner brought a habeas 
petition claiming that the State knowingly suborned perjury.241 In 
remanding the district court’s summary dismissal of the petition, the 
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Seventh Circuit held that “[a]s in Pyle v. Kansas . . . the perjury 
allegation here has been neither ‘refuted nor denied . . . .’”242 
Third, even though Pyle dealt primarily with perjury and only 
tangentially dealt with an unsubstantiated claim of suppressed 
evidence, courts frequently cite it in the latter context. As the Fifth 
Circuit noted in United States v. DeVoe, “Pyle has been construed to 
mean that the ‘suppression of evidence favorable’ to the accused is in 
itself sufficient to constitute denial of due process.”243 
Fourth, the Supreme Court has cited Pyle twenty-six times, including 
in all of its important post-Brady opinions.244 
4. Durley v. Mayo 
As noted, in Durley v. Mayo, a majority of the Supreme Court found 
that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Dan Durley’s claim that the State’s 
unknowing subornation of perjury violated due process.245 In his 
dissenting opinion however, Justice Douglas held that the denial of a 
hearing on Durley’s habeas petition deprived him of due process of 
law.246 The Brady Court ultimately used a “Cf.” citation in reference to 
this dissenting opinion.247 
Given that this was merely a dissenting opinion, it is unsurprising 
that a majority of courts have not since found that the unknowing 
subornation of perjury violates due process. As the Supreme Court of 
New Mexico noted in Case v. Hatch, “[a] majority of the federal circuit 
courts require a knowing use of perjured testimony by the prosecution 
to find a violation of due process.”248 That said, the Supreme Court of 
New Mexico ended up finding that the unknowing subornation of 
perjury can support a due process violation after noting that Justice 
Douglas’ dissenting opinion in Durley “would have held that 
‘[d]eprivation of a [habeas corpus] hearing under these circumstances 
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amounts . . . to a denial of due process of law.’”249 Similarly, the Second 
Circuit cited the Durley dissent to reach the same result.250 
The United States Supreme Court has never adopted the holding of 
the Durley dissent, but it has flirted with it twice when asked to stay 
executions. In Edwards v. New York, the Court was asked to stay an 
execution based on the claim, inter alia, that the State had unknowingly 
suborned perjury from the defendant’s alleged accomplice.251 In 
denying the stay, the Court acknowledged that the Durley dissent held 
“that in some circumstances the innocent use of perjured testimony 
might involve a denial of due process.”252 But the Edwards Court 
ultimately found that “[t]he circumstances in Durley . . . bear no 
resemblance to the situation presented here.”253 
Later, in 1995, the Supreme Court was asked to stay the execution of 
Jesse Dewayne Jacobs, who confessed to fatally shooting Etta Urdiales; 
Jacobs’ confession was read at his trial.254 The State subsequently 
prosecuted Jacobs’ alleged accomplice, Bobbie Hogan, and called Jacobs, 
who testified that it was Hogan who shot Urdiales.255 Several police 
officers also testified “that portions of Jacobs’ confession were 
untrue.”256 The prosecutor ultimately explained to the jury that his 
theory of the case had changed and that he now believed that Hogan 
shot Urdiales and that Jacobs “did not in any way anticipate that the 
victim would be shot.”257  
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg dissented from the decision not to 
grant the stay of execution, noting that Justice Douglas’ dissenting 
opinion in Durley would have found a due process violation based on 
similar facts.258 Indeed, the dissenting justices observed that “[h]ere, the 
facts are far stronger than in Durley, as the State itself has formally 
vouched for the credibility of Jacobs’ recantation of his confession and 
police officers have testified, under oath, that parts of Jacobs’ confession 
were false.”259 
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5. Alcorta v. Texas 
Alcorta v. Texas was one of the two cases cited by the Brady Court in 
which a defendant was given relief. As noted, the Alcorta Court granted 
the defendant a new trial based upon the prosecutor’s own admission 
that he had knowingly solicited and failed to correct false testimony by 
a key State’s witness.260 Understandably, then, the Supreme Court has 
cited Alcorta eleven times, and lower courts have used Alcorta to 
support their findings that the knowing failure to correct false 
testimony is a due process violation.  
For example, in Hayes v. Brown, the prosecutor “knowingly presented 
false evidence to the jury and made false representations to the trial 
judge as to whether the State had agreed not to prosecute [the 
defendant’s accomplice] on his pending felony charges.”261 In finding a 
due process violation, the Ninth Circuit held that “Alcorta . . . involved 
a case quite similar to the one at bar” and compelled the finding that 
the prosecutor violated the Due Process Clause.262 
6. Napue v. Illinois 
Napue v. Illinois was the second case cited by the Brady Court in 
which a defendant was given relief.263 As noted, the Napue Court found 
that a prosecutor violated due process by failing to correct unexpected 
false testimony regarding a plea agreement by a State’s witness.264 Napue 
has since become “the leading perjury case,”265 with the Supreme Court 
citing it forty times. 
Lower courts have also frequently cited Napue in perjury cases. For 
example, in Jenkins v. Artuz, Eric Jenkins was convicted of second-
degree murder and criminal possession of a weapon.266 This conviction 
was secured largely through the testimony of a witness for the 
prosecution who falsely testified that he wasn’t testifying pursuant to a 
plea agreement.267 In finding a due process violation, the Second Circuit 
cited to Napue and concluded that “[t]he case at bar presents similar 
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facts” because Jenkins’ prosecutor also did not correct the witness’ false 
testimony.268 
7. Wilde v. Wyoming 
As noted, in Wilde v. Wyoming, the Supreme Court remanded a 
defendant’s claim that he was induced into pleading guilty to second-
degree murder based on the suppression of two eyewitness statements 
and the denial of his right to counsel.269 As in Pyle v. Kansas, the 
Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine 
whether there was a due process violation.270 
In the fourteen years after Wilde was issued, courts cited the case 
twelve times. For example, in 1962, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
remanded a decision denying postconviction relief to a petitioner who 
claimed that the State suppressed material exculpatory evidence.271 The 
court largely based the decision to remand on prior precedent holding 
that “the suppression by the State of evidence tending to exculpate a 
defendant is a ground for relief.”272 That prior precedent was two cases: 
Wilde v. Wyoming and the Court of Appeals’ own prior opinion in Brady 
v. State,273 which was later affirmed in Brady v. Maryland.274 
A couple of years later, in 1964, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit relied upon Wilde to reverse a robbery conviction 
based upon the State’s suppression of two exculpatory statements by 
eyewitnesses.275 In granting the defendant relief, the court noted the 
similarity between the case at hand and Wilde, where an evidentiary 
hearing was granted based on the petitioner’s allegation “that the 
prosecutor wilfully suppressed the testimony of two eyewitnesses to the 
alleged crime which would have exonerated the petitioner.”276 
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During this stretch of fourteen years, courts would often cite Wilde 
and Pyle in conjunction as the pre-Brady cases standing for the 
proposition that the suppression of favorable evidence can violate due 
process.277 The Seventh Circuit was the last court to cite Wilde during 
this fourteen-year stretch, in its 1974 opinion in Christman v. 
Hanrahan.278 In Christman, the court traced the history of the Brady 
doctrine, noting how the Brady Court started by citing to Mooney v. 
Holohan and then created the Brady doctrine “[a]fter reviewing later 
cases in which it is fair to state that the entire proceedings were 
fundamentally unfair”: Pyle v. Kansas, Napue v. Illinois, Alcorta v. Texas, 
and Wilde v. Wyoming.279  
But then, the Wilde opinion disappeared. Between 1975 and 2016, not 
a single court cited Wilde. This streak was finally broken in December 
2017, when the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama collaterally 
quoted Wilde as part of a block quote to Brady.280 Wilde’s four-decade 
absence from court opinions is surprising given that both defendants 
and the State continue to cite it in their briefs. Most recently, last year, 
an appellant convicted of murder cited to Wilde in his brief to the 
Supreme Court of Florida to establish his claim that the suppression of 
material exculpatory evidence constituted a Giglio violation.281 A year 
earlier, a defendant cited Wilde in support of a claim to the Fourth 
Circuit that the State violated the Brady doctrine by withholding an 
alternate suspect’s confession.282 Meanwhile, states have even cited to 
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Wilde to argue that the evidence it suppressed was less exculpatory than 
the evidence in Wilde.283  
Defendants have also continued to cite Wilde in support of claims that 
the pre-plea suppression of favorable substantive evidence violates the 
Brady doctrine. For example, in 2013, Alan Combs cited Wilde in his 
brief to the Supreme Court of Washington to claim that the State 
violated the Brady doctrine by suppressing favorable fingerprint 
evidence prior to his nolo contendere plea.284 And, in 1992, Douglas 
Thomas used Wilde in his brief to the Supreme Court of Virginia to 
support his claim that the State committed a Brady violation by 
suppressing evidence that could have supported an involuntary 
intoxication defense prior to his guilty plea.285 Neither of these courts, 
however, ended up addressing Wilde or even the merits of either 
defendant’s Brady claim.286 Instead, as noted, no court cited Wilde 
between 1975 and 2016. 
So, how did Wilde go from being cited next to its Brady peers as late 
as 1974 to being relegated to the dustbin of history? There’s no clear 
answer. One possibility comes in the form of the Supreme Court’s 1976 
opinion in United States v. Agurs.287 In Agurs, the Court created a kind 
of unified theory of Brady, finding that it applied in “three quite 
different situations.”288 One situation was the Agurs case itself, with the 
State suppressing exculpatory evidence that wasn’t requested (or 
specifically requested) by the defense.289 Another situation is the 
suppression of exculpatory evidence requested by the defense, which 
the Agurs Court illustrated solely through the Brady case.290 Finally, the 
other situation is the subornation of perjury, which the Agurs Court 
 
 283 See, e.g., Reply Brief of Appellant, Angelone v. Dabney, 560 S.E.2d 253 (Va. 2002) 
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noted was typified by seven cases, including Mooney v. Holohan, Pyle v. 
Kansas, Alcorta v. Texas, and Napue v. Illinois.291 
One theory is that courts consulted Agurs rather than Brady in 
subsequent cases, explaining Wilde’s omission from later opinions 
because Wilde was not cited in Agurs. This theory finds some support 
in precedent. About a month after Agurs, the Court of Criminal Appeals 
of Oklahoma did not mention Wilde but (1) noted that Agurs clarified 
the Brady doctrine; and (2) cited the same opinions cited in Agurs in 
adjudicating a defendant’s claim that the State violated “the doctrine 
enunciated in Brady v. Maryland.”292 Later that same year, an appellate 
court in Illinois traced the history of the Brady doctrine from Mooney 
through Pyle, Alcorta, and Napue, omitting Wilde.293 Then, the next 
year, the Supreme Court of Colorado noted that “[i]n a long line of 
cases, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that the suppression 
of material evidence, favorable to the defendant and relating either to 
guilt or punishment, is a denial of due process which requires reversal 
of a conviction.”294 That “long line” again omitted Wilde but included 
Mooney, Pyle, Alcorta, Napue, Brady, and “[t]he Supreme Court’s latest 
pronouncement on this subject i[n] United States v. Agurs.”295 It thus 
seems plausible that the Agurs Court’s failure to cite Wilde led to its 
banishment. 
Another possible explanation is the lack of available information 
about the Wilde case. As noted, until recently, the only publicly 
available information about Wilde was the Supreme Court’s one 
paragraph per curiam opinion, which reveals next to nothing about the 
facts of the case. And, as noted in the last several Subsections, courts 
frequently cite the other Supreme Court cases referenced in Brady to 
resolve disputes involving analogous factual contexts.296 In the absence 
of a factual record in Wilde, such analogies are difficult. Additionally, 
without further facts, it is difficult to tell whether the suppression 
allegation in Wilde was a major or minor part of the petitioner’s claim. 
To answer pertinent questions about Wilde, I tracked down twenty-
two pages of documents connected to the case that had been 
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sequestered in the Wyoming State archives.297 These pages establish the 
centrality of the suppression claim and the importance of Wilde in the 
creation of the Brady doctrine. 
B. The Facts of the Wilde Case 
As the newly discovered documents make clear, in his pro se petition 
for writ of habeas corpus, Victor Donald Wilde alleged the following: A 
stranger named Henry Wallace approached him at a bus station in 
Madison, Nebraska.298 Wallace was driving to California and looking 
for paying passengers.299 Wilde, who was seeking to visit his mother in 
California, agreed to accompany Wallace, pay half the expenses, and 
share the driving load.300 Upon starting their trip, the two men picked 
up two young hitchhikers in their late teens.301 Around midnight, the 
four men checked into a motel room in eastern Wyoming with two 
beds.302 Wilde shared a bed with Wallace, who made “indecent 
advances in a homosexual manner” that Wilde rebuffed, prompting 
some words between the two men.303 
The next day, Wallace bought and drank nearly three pints of 
whiskey; “as Wallace progressed in his drinking, his temper and 
disposition became meaner.”304 Wallace kept harping on the incident 
from the prior night, prompting Wilde to become disgusted and ask to 
be let out of the car.305 However, Wallace continued driving for another 
fifteen to twenty minutes while muttering under his breath before 
jamming on the brakes and pulling over to the side of the road.306  
Wallace then exited the car and opened the passenger door, leading 
to Wilde falling out of the car.307 Before Wilde could “right himself,” 
 
 297 A compendium of these documents can be viewed at Appendix to Colin Miller, 
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Wallace began attacking him.308 Wilde, however, got the better of 
Wallace, knocking him down four to five times.309 Wilde saw Wallace 
stumbling to the front seat of the car and thought that he had given 
up.310 Upon turning around to look for a resting spot, Wilde “heard a 
warning shout from the car.”311 It was the hitchhikers warning Wilde 
that Wallace had a gun. When Wilde turned around, he “was facing a 
wildly infuriated Wallace who definitely had the look of murder about 
him.”312 Wilde, who carried a gun on him, “instinctively drew and fired 
without thinking,” killing Wallace.313 
The hitchhikers and Wilde then got Wallace’s body into the car and 
drove to a gas station because the gas tank was close to empty.314 While 
Wilde was filling up the car, the hitchhikers ran away.315 Wilde then 
drove the car toward a sheriff’s station, but the car went off an icy 
highway, which is where a sheriff’s posse arrested him.316  
Wilde was later charged with first-degree murder.317 He had two 
appointed attorneys, one of whom might have been named Ivan 
Jones.318 After Wilde told his story to his attorneys, they responded that 
it was a clear case of self-defense.319 Thereafter, however, Wilde was left 
alone in county jail for twenty days.320 Eventually, the sheriff came and 
asked if he would plead guilty to second-degree murder because 
otherwise he would be convicted of first-degree murder and be given 
the death penalty.321  
Wilde asked to see his attorneys and was told he couldn’t see them 
unless he went to court. Wilde agreed and saw one of his attorneys, who 
told him he would not represent him unless Wilde paid him $1,500, 
which would lead to Wilde not serving a day in prison.322 When Wilde 
refused, his attorney told him to plead guilty to second-degree 
 
 308 Id. at 4, Miller, reprinted in Miller, Appendix, supra note 297, at 9. 
 309 Id.  
 310 Id. 
 311 Id. 
 312 Id. 
 313 Id. 
 314 Id. 
 315 Id. at 5, Miller, reprinted in Miller, Appendix, supra note 297, at 10.  
 316 Id. 
 317 Id. 
 318 Id. at 6, Miller, reprinted in Miller, Appendix, supra note 297, at 11.  
 319 Id. 
 320 Id. 
 321 Id. 
 322 Id. 
  
312 University of California, Davis [Vol. 53:271 
murder.323 Without his attorney present, Wilde entered the judge’s 
chamber on December 13, 1945 and pleaded guilty to second-degree 
murder, resulting in him being given a life sentence.324 
In his habeas petition, Wilde alleged several errors. First and 
foremost, Wilde claimed that the State (1) suppressed exculpatory 
statements by the hitchhikers that would have proven his claim of self-
defense; and (2) intimidated the hitchhikers into making false 
statements against him at the coroner’s jury.325 Second, while Wilde 
admitted that he met with attorneys twice, he alleged that he was 
deprived of his right to counsel by not having an attorney present when 
he pleaded guilty.326 Third, Wilde made various other claims such as 
the denial of his right to a grand jury and being given an illegal sentence 
of “natural life” when the statute authorized a sentence of twenty years 
to life.327 
In its answer, the State curtly responded that Wilde “was properly 
represented by counsel, that in all instances he had the benefit of due 
process of law, and none of his constitutional rights were invaded or 
denied.”328 The court’s order denying Wilde’s petition and a hearing on 
his petition was equally short, with the court quickly responding that 
“Victor Donald Wilde is legally detained in custody.”329 
C. Why Wilde Should be Resuscitated 
Obviously, the facts alleged by Wilde should be taken with a grain of 
salt, and it would be nice to hear the State’s version of events. But the 
lack of the State’s version is also kind of the point. The Supreme Court 
remanded because neither the State nor the Wyoming courts had 
refuted Wilde’s allegations,330 which principally related to the 
suppression of statements by the hitchhikers.331 The Court also 
remanded on the issue of the denial of the right to counsel,332 but this 
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was not based on the total denial of that right but instead just denial of 
that right at the moment of pleading.333 Notably, the Court did not 
remand on Wilde’s other allegations, implying that it highlighted the 
suppression and counsel claims as the ones stating constitutional 
violations (unless refuted by the State). And, of course, when the Brady 
Court cited Wilde as extending the due process test first enunciated in 
Mooney,334 it was speaking solely about suppression, which implicates 
the Due Process Clause, and not the denial of the right to counsel, which 
implicates the Sixth Amendment.335 
The fact that Wilde was a case that was principally about the 
suppression of eyewitness statements before a defendant pleaded guilty 
bolsters the argument that it should be revitalized to recognize a clear 
right to evidence of innocence before pleading guilty. As noted, the 
Supreme Court itself as well as other courts and commentators have 
found that the Brady doctrine was merely an extension of the Mooney 
line of cases, with Brady simply making the good faith or bad faith of 
the State irrelevant.336 Given the limited nature of the Brady extension, 
it seems like the legitimacy of the Brady doctrine hinges on the existence 
of pre-existing precedent holding that the State’s suppression of 
material exculpatory evidence can violate the Due Process Clause.  
And yet, four of the six Supreme Court cases cited by the Brady Court 
— Mooney v. Holohan, Durley v. Mayo, Alcorta v. Texas, and Napue v. 
Illinois — solely dealt with the subornation of perjury and had nothing 
to do with the suppression of evidence.337 Meanwhile, a fifth case — 
Pyle v. Kansas — dealt principally with the subornation of perjury338 
and only secondarily with the suppression of evidence.339 In this 
context, the importance of Wilde is apparent. As the only pre-Brady case 
based principally on the suppression of exculpatory evidence, it would 
seem to provide the heart of the Brady doctrine. Conversely, if Wilde is 
not seen as recognizing a due process right to exculpatory evidence, the 
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Brady doctrine appears difficult to defend, given that the Brady Court 
itself acknowledged that it wasn’t breaking much new ground. 
And, indeed, other commentators have challenged the foundational 
weakness of the Brady doctrine. For instance, Professor Colin Starger 
has noted that “it is quite a leap to infer an affirmative duty to disclose 
exculpatory evidence from cases that imposed a negative prohibition on 
suborning perjury or allowing lies to stand uncorrected.”340 Meanwhile, 
Professor Eugene Cerruti has observed that on the eve of Brady “there 
was virtually no law requiring pretrial discovery by the defense of 
exculpatory material within the state’s possession,” with Mooney and its 
progeny dealing solely with subornation of perjury.341  
The Supreme Court itself has even recognized the possible 
foundational weakness of the Brady doctrine. In Imbler v. Pachtman, the 
Court addressed the question of whether the test for qualified immunity 
differs depending on whether a prosecutor suppressed evidence or 
suborned perjury.342 While Justice White’s concurrence would have 
drawn such a distinction, the majority found that “the distinction is not 
susceptible of practical application” because “[a] claim of using 
perjured testimony simply may be reframed and asserted as a claim of 
suppression of the evidence upon which the knowledge of perjury 
rested.”343 As support for this claim, the Court cited to its prior opinions 
“discussing the constitutional prohibitions against both practices,” 
including Mooney v. Holohan, Alcorta v. Texas, and Brady v. Maryland.344 
But this citation was incorrect because Mooney and Alcorta solely 
discussed the subornation of perjury and did not mention suppressed 
evidence.345  
The reality is that Pyle v. Kansas and Wilde v. Wyoming were the only 
two pre-Brady Supreme Court cases dealing with the suppression of 
exculpatory evidence.346 This explains why, as noted, courts often cited 
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Wilde and Pyle in conjunction as the pre-Brady cases standing for the 
proposition that the suppression of favorable evidence can violate due 
process.347 Since 1974, however, courts have only cited Pyle for this 
proposition.348 Pyle’s continuing vitality349 provides support for the 
claim that Wilde should be resuscitated. 
Standing alone, Wilde could be dismissed as a case in which the 
Supreme Court merely remanded a petitioner’s claim that the State’s 
suppression of exculpatory evidence violated the Due Process Clause 
and did not actually find such a violation. But a review of Pyle reveals 
the exact same factual context. Like Victor Wilde, Harry Pyle filed a pro 
se petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging the suppression of 
exculpatory evidence, and, like Wilde, Pyle merely received a 
remand.350 Indeed, after Pyle was remanded, the Supreme Court of 
Kansas found no evidence that the State had suborned perjury or 
suppressed evidence351 while there is some indication that Wilde was 
given relief on remand.352  
Finally, it is important to note that the Brady Court held that Pyle v. 
Kansas phrased the due process rule from Mooney v. Holohan “in 
broader terms.”353 In Mooney, the Court actually dismissed the 
defendant’s case, finding that he had pleaded a plausible due process 
violation but failed to seek state habeas relief.354 Moreover, as noted, 
when Mooney did seek state habeas relief, the Supreme Court of 
California found no evidence of a due process violation.355 And yet, 
courts continue to cite Mooney to find due process violations.356 
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In conclusion, then, the continuing vitality of Pyle and Mooney means 
that there is no good reason to ignore Wilde. It is true that the Wilde 
Court merely remanded, but that was the same action taken by the Pyle 
Court and certainly no worse than the dismissal in Mooney. Because 
courts continue to cite Mooney and Pyle as illustrations of due process 
violations,357 they should do the same with Wilde. Therefore, unless 
Wilde has been repudiated, courts, including the Supreme Court, 
should resuscitate Wilde to find a right to evidence of innocence before 
pleading guilty that is part of the heart of the Brady doctrine.  
This wouldn’t be the first instance of such a resuscitation. In 1794, 
the Supreme Court issued its opinion in United States v. Yale Todd at a 
time when there was no official reporter, leading to the opinion being 
forgotten.358 Later, in its 1851 opinion in United States v. Ferreira, the 
Supreme Court rediscovered Yale Todd and recognized that it resolved 
“a question which was left in doubt by the opinions of the different 
judges.”359 The Ferreira Court then resuscitated Yale Todd by appending 
it to its opinion “in order that it may not be overlooked, if similar 
questions should hereafter arise.”360 If the Supreme Court were to revive 
Wilde, it would similarly be binding precedent on lower courts.361  
The remaining question, however, is whether the Supreme Court 
impliedly repudiated Wilde in United States v. Ruiz. 
V. THE SUPREME COURT DID NOT REPUDIATE WILDE IN RUIZ 
As noted, in United States v. Ruiz, the Supreme Court held that there 
is no pre-plea right to material impeachment evidence.362 The Ruiz 
Court did not explicitly reference Wilde, but Ruiz could be seen as an 
implied repudiation of Wilde if (1) Ruiz could be read in conjunction 
with other Supreme Court precedent as a rejection of a right to evidence 
of innocence before pleading guilty; or (2) Ruiz itself could be read as a 
rejection of a right to evidence of innocence before pleading guilty. The 
following two Sections will address these possibilities. 
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A. No Distinction Between Impeachment and Substantive Evidence 
As noted, some courts have taken a two-step approach to finding that 
Ruiz can be read in conjunction with other Supreme Court precedent as 
rejecting a right to evidence of innocence before pleading guilty.363 
First, Ruiz held that there is no pre-plea right to material impeachment 
evidence.364 Second, the Supreme Court affirmed in United States v. 
Bagley that “[t]his Court has rejected any such distinction between 
impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence.”365 Therefore, these 
courts conclude that the Ruiz Court’s finding that there is no pre-plea 
right to material impeachment evidence means that there is no pre-plea 
right to material substantive evidence.366 
These courts, however, are ignoring the limited nature of the Bagley 
Court’s ruling. As noted, in Bagley, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
State’s suppression of impeachment evidence required automatic 
reversal without a showing of materiality under Brady.367 The Supreme 
Court later reversed, holding that “[t]his Court has rejected any such 
distinction between impeachment evidence and exculpatory 
evidence.”368 The Bagley Court’s use of the word “such” is important 
because it means the Supreme Court was merely saying that it had 
rejected any distinction between impeachment and substantive 
evidence in terms of Brady’s materiality analysis. As one district court 
has noted, “[t]he ‘any such distinction’ referred to the lower court’s 
conclusion that omission of impeachment information mandated an 
automatic reversal, whereas omission of exculpatory information did 
not require automatic reversal.”369 Therefore, “[t]he Court in Bagley did 
not categorically reject all distinctions between exculpatory and 
impeachment evidence.”370  
This, of course, makes sense because the Supreme Court “has not 
treated exculpatory evidence and impeachment information as 
indistinguishable.”371 Multiple examples can be found in the Federal 
Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) adopted by the Supreme Court in 1972. For 
instance, a prior inconsistent statement by a witness that was not made 
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subject to the penalty of perjury is admissible under FRE 613 to 
impeach the witness but inadmissible as substantive evidence of the 
truth of the matter asserted.372 And evidence of a subsequent remedial 
measure is generally inadmissible as substantive evidence but 
potentially admissible as impeachment evidence under FRE 407.373 The 
Supreme Court has also created an “impeachment exception” to the 
exclusionary rule that allows illegally obtained evidence to be offered 
for impeachment, but not substantive, purposes.374 
Therefore, the mere fact that the Bagley Court did not distinguish 
between impeachment evidence and substantive evidence in terms of 
materiality tells us little about whether the Supreme Court would 
distinguish between impeachment evidence and substantive evidence in 
terms of the applicability of the Brady doctrine in the pleading context. 
The last remaining question is thus whether the Ruiz Court itself 
conflated impeachment evidence and substantive evidence in this 
context.  
B. The Ruiz Court Did Not Repudiate Wilde 
In finding no pre-plea right to material impeachment evidence, the 
Supreme Court clearly distinguished a case like Ruiz from a case like 
Wilde. The Ruiz Court focused upon the extent to which recognizing a 
pre-plea right to material impeachment evidence would provide an 
additional safeguard for innocent defendants.375 In rejecting the 
defendant’s concern that the lack of such a right would lead to innocent 
defendants pleading guilty, the Ruiz Court observed that the plea 
agreement offered to the defendant stated that “the Government will 
provide ‘any information establishing the factual innocence of the 
defendant’ regardless.”376 By making this observation, the Court 
acknowledged that the result would, or at least could, have been 
different if the State had withheld substantive evidence of innocence 
instead of impeachment evidence.377 
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In finding no pre-plea right to material impeachment evidence, the 
Ruiz Court also focused on other factors that distinguish impeachment 
evidence from substantive evidence of innocence. The Ruiz Court noted 
that there is no pre-plea right to impeachment evidence because “the 
need for this information is more closely related to the fairness of a trial 
than to the voluntariness of the plea.”378 By concluding that 
impeachment evidence is “special” in relation to the fairness of trials, 
the Ruiz court implied that substantive evidence of innocence does 
relate to the voluntariness of pleas.379 In other words, if impeachment 
evidence is “special” in relation to the fairness of trials, this implies that 
substantive evidence in not specially connected to trials and that its 
suppression in connection with pleading can violate the Brady doctrine. 
The Ruiz Court also observed that “[i]t is particularly difficult to 
characterize impeachment information as critical information of which 
the defendant must always be aware prior to pleading guilty given the 
random way in which such information may, or may not, help a 
particular defendant.”380 This particular difficulty relates to the fact that 
defendants (and often prosecutors) do not know whether particular 
witnesses will be critical or even called before the defendant pleads 
guilty.381 Conversely, there is no such difficulty in characterizing 
substantive evidence of innocence such as a video showing that an 
assault did not occur, exculpatory eyewitness statements, or DNA 
evidence.382  
The Ruiz Court’s reasoning makes clear that the Court did not 
definitely rule on a right to evidence of innocence before pleading 
guilty, meaning it should not be read as an implied repudiation of Wilde. 
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Moreover, “the Court in Ruiz used the terms ‘exculpatory’ and 
‘impeachment’ separately, rather than as identical terms,”383 again 
invalidating any claim of an implied repudiation. Therefore, courts 
should view Wilde as a viable Supreme Court opinion holding that the 
right to evidence of innocence before pleading guilty is clearly 
established federal law. 
CONCLUSION 
In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that the State has an 
affirmative obligation under the Due Process Clause to disclose material 
exculpatory evidence to defendants.384 In the wake of United States v. 
Ruiz, however, many courts have held that defendants have no pre-plea 
right to substantive evidence of innocence.385 Given that around 95% of 
convictions are secured through guilty pleas,386 such an interpretation 
of Brady means that few defendants are entitled to evidence of their 
innocence before being convicted. This statistic is significant because it 
is now clear that innocent defendants do plead guilty. Specifically, in 
2015 and 2016, a total of 139 out of 314 DNA and non-DNA exonerees 
(44.26%) had been convicted after guilty pleas.387 
But courts finding no pre-plea right to substantive evidence of 
innocence are ignoring a key part of the foundation of the Brady 
doctrine. The Brady Court held that the Brady doctrine was an 
extension of six prior Supreme Court cases, four of which dealt solely 
with the subornation of perjury.388 That leaves two cases cited by the 
Brady Court that dealt with the suppression of exculpatory evidence: 
(1) Pyle v. Kansas, in which the Court remanded a claim that the State 
suppressed evidence of innocence before trial;389 and (2) Wilde v. 
Wyoming, in which the Court remanded a claim that the State 
suppressed evidence of innocence before a guilty plea.390 For years, 
courts cited these two cases in conjunction to conclude that the 
suppression of material exculpatory evidence violates Due Process 
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Clause.391 But while Wilde has never been repudiated, it has fallen off 
the map392 while courts continue to cite Pyle for this proposition.393  
By unearthing the pleadings in the Wilde case, this Article has 
established that Victor Donald Wilde’s habeas petition primarily 
claimed that his guilty plea was induced by the State’s suppression of 
exculpatory eyewitness statements. Therefore, by remanding in Wilde, 
the Supreme Court recognized a right to evidence before pleading guilty 
just as it recognized a right to evidence of innocence before trial by 
remanding in Pyle. Courts should therefore resuscitate Wilde to find a 
clear right to evidence of innocence before pleading guilty. 
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